



NDSS DNS Privacy 2021
Daniel Kahn Gillmor
dkg@aclu.org


Protecting the Back Half of the Camel





Stub to
Recursor

Recursor to
Authoritative














Resolver Operators are Stewards of Client Activity

- Timing analysis
- Traffic size analysis
- Correlations



Associational Metadata

The image is a screenshot of a web browser displaying an article from The New Yorker. The browser's address bar shows the URL: `newyorker.com/magazine/2018/10/15/was-there-a-connection-b...`. The page header includes the New Yorker logo and a 'Subscribe' button. The article title is 'WAS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN A RUSSIAN BANK AND THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN?' and the subtitle is 'A REPORTER AT LARGE OCTOBER 15, 2018 ISSUE'. The author is 'By Dexter Filkins' and the date is 'October 8, 2018'. A snippet of the article text is visible: 'A team of computer scientists sifted through records of unusual Web traffic in search of answers.'

Was There a Connection Between a Russian Bank and the Trump Campaign?

THE NEW YORKER

Subscribe

A REPORTER AT LARGE OCTOBER 15, 2018 ISSUE

WAS THERE A CONNECTION BETWEEN A RUSSIAN BANK AND THE TRUMP CAMPAIGN?

A team of computer scientists sifted through records of unusual Web traffic in search of answers.

By Dexter Filkins
October 8, 2018

Non-encryption Mitigations


- QNAME Minimization
- NXDOMAIN synthesis (RFC 8198)
- NXDOMAIN cuts (RFC 8020)
- Pre-fetching
- Request pooling (delays)
- ...

Even Second-level Domains can be Sensitive

- `falundafa.org`
- `nra.org`
- `plannedparenthood.org`
- `parler.com`
- `disruptj20.org`
- ...

Resolver Operators are at Risk


- Legal demands
- Extralegal investigation



Resolver Operators are Stewards of *Subject* Activity

Beyond IP address lookups...

- SMIMEA
- OPENPGPKEY
- DNS UPDATE
- TXT (e.g., DKIM selectors)
- ...



Surveillance enables Censorship

- Tampering
- Blocking
- *Affects subject,
regardless of querier*




What can we do?

How to get there (easy/unilateral)

- Augmenting Authoritatives (DoT? DoQ? DoH?)
- Opportunistic strategies for resolvers: probing, pooling
- Resource management (resolvers & authoritative)

How to get there? (riskier, needs coordination)

- Authentication (WebPKI or DANE)
- Who signals? (Nameserver or Domain)
- How to signal? (special NS label or separate record)
- What to signal? (Avoid, Report, Require)



Questions?

Daniel Kahn Gillmor
dkg@aclu.org

dns-privacy@ietf.org